Evidence suggests that Zika virus has driven a 10-fold increase in babies born with microcephaly in Brazil, prompting the WHO to declare a Public Health Emergency of International Concern. However, little is known about the natural history of infection. These data are critical for implementing surveillance and control measures such as protecting the blood supply.
INTRODUCTION 1
The explosion of Zika cases in Central and South America, combined with growing evidence that the 2 virus is responsible for an epidemic of microcephaly in Brazil, has prompted the World Health 3 Organization (WHO) to declare a Public Health Emergency of International Concern. 1 As of February 29, 4 2016, there have been at least a half-million Zika virus infections in the Americas. 2, 3 Although clinical 5 disease is generally mild or asymptomatic, 4 there is increasing evidence of a link between Zika virus 6 infection and severe microcephaly in infants born to women infected during pregnancy, including a 10-7 fold increase in microcephaly cases in Brazil in the wake of the 2015 Zika epidemic 5 . Zika virus infection 8 has been linked to Guillain-Barre in adults. 5,6 9 10
The severity of these complications highlights the need to protect pregnant women from 11 infection and to ensure that blood supplies remain safe both in areas experiencing ongoing Zika virus 12 transmission and in locations with travelers returning from affected areas. That large proportion of Zika 13 infections that remain asymptomatic, 4 inadequacy of current diagnostics, and uncertainties regarding 14 the duration of viremia and viral shedding have raised concerns about the potential threat of 15 transmission through blood transfusion. In a 2013-2014 outbreak in French Polynesia, researchers found 16 that 3% of asymptomatic blood donors were infected with Zika virus, 7 and several cases of possible Zika 17 transmission through blood transfusion are currently being investigated in Brazil. 8 As a result, some 18 agencies now recommend halting blood donations in areas with active Zika transmission. 9, 10 If 19 implemented, these bans could result in severe blood supply shortages. Research to determine the 20 duration of viremia and time to antibody seroconversion is therefore vital to quantify the risk to blood 21 supplies, and develop efficient strategies for protection. Furthermore, more detailed estimates of key 22 distributions in the natural history of Zika virus infection, including the incubation period and probable 23 infectious period, are essential to designing evidence based surveillance systems and informing public 24 health policy. 11,12 25 26 In order to better characterize the natural history of Zika infection and inform disease 27 prevention, surveillance, and blood supply safety, we performed a systematic literature review and 28 pooled analysis of available data to estimate the incubation period, time to seroconversion, and length 29 Two reviewers (CTO, LHC, JW, AC) independently screened titles and abstracts for relevance. We 50 excluded publications from full text review if they were not about Zika virus or if they definitively met 51 one of the exclusion criteria. Two reviewers (CTO, LHC, JW, AC) independently performed full text 52 reviews to identify publications with sufficient data for analysis; we contacted authors via email to 53 obtain additional information for publications that were relevant but did not provide sufficient data for 54 analysis. Discrepancies were resolved by discussion and consensus. 55 56
Data abstraction 57
Two reviewers (CTO, LC, JW, AC) independently abstracted data using a standardized form and resolved 58 discrepancies by discussion and consensus. We abstracted data necessary to estimate: 1) the incubation 59 period of Zika virus, 2) the time and duration of viral shedding, and 3) the time to antibody 60 seropositivity. We reviewed text, tables, and figures for information that allowed us to bound the time 61 of: 1) exposure to Zika virus, 2) symptom onset, 3) collection of samples for Zika virus testing, and 4) 62 collection of samples for antibody testing. For all virologic and serologic samples, the reported test 63 result was recorded, and IgM specific serologies were noted when available. When possible, the exact 64 timing of events was used, otherwise timing of the event was bounded based upon available 65 information (e.g., travel dates to Zika endemic regions). We further recorded basic demographic 66 characteristics, the type of sample collected (e.g., blood, urine), and, when available, the mode of 67
transmission. 68
Extracted data was used to construct a data set bounding the time of key events. The time of 70 Zika infection was bounded by the earliest and latest potential time of Zika virus exposure consistent 71 with the case report. When no latest time of exposure could be determined (e.g., the case developed 72 symptoms while in a Zika endemic area) the latest possible time of symptom onset was considered to be 73 the latest possible time of exposure, the most conservative assumption we could make. Time of 74 symptom onset was bounded based on the case report, and in most cases was specified to the nearest Bounding periods were used to construct doubly interval censored data sets for each distribution, 15 and 86 distributions were fit using an adaptation of techniques previously described. 15, 16 Briefly, MCMC 87 techniques were used to simultaneously fit the incubation period distribution (log-normal), distribution 88 of time to IgM seroconversion (Weibull), and time to viral clearance (Weibull) to the doubly interval 89 censored data. Given a time of infection the distributions were considered to be independent. The mean 90 incubation period, and the times by which we expect 5%, 25%, 50%, 75%, and 95% of those who do 91
develop Zika symptoms to become symptomatic were estimated. Full details are available in the 92 supplemental appendix. 93
Statistical Methods -Blood Supply Safety 95
The impact of key distributions on blood supply safety was calculated assuming a constant incidence 96 rate. The number of possibly infected donors per 100,000 if no screening occurs was calculated as: (daily 97 incidence rate per 100,000) ⨉ (mean time to viral clearance). This estimate was adjusted for symptom 98 based screening based on mean time to symptom onset, assuming that 80% of the population remains 99 asymptomatic. The effect of serological based screening was calculated based on the mean time to the 100 first of seroconversion or viral clearance (assuming independence), as the former cases would be 101 successfully screened, and the latter would no longer be infectious. We assumed that any screening about Zika in humans or lacking appropriate data). Among 118 articles selected for full text review and 119 possible data abstraction, 86 did not have sufficient exposure information or dates of onset to estimate 120 key distributions, and 11 reported suspected perinatal transmission. Authors were contacted for 4 121 articles lacking sufficient information on one or more cases; additional information was returned on one 122 case, but we were still unable to bound the time of exposure. We extracted data from 21 articles that 123 provided information on 25 unique Zika cases ( 
Key Distributions 136
We estimate the median incubation period of Zika virus to be 5.9 days (95% CI: 4.4-7.6), with a 137 dispersion of 1.46 (95% CI: 1.23-1.94). Hence, 5% of cases will develop symptoms by 3.2 days after 138 infection (95% CI: 1.7-4.6), 25% by 4.6 days (95% CI: 3.1, 6.0), 75% by 7.6 days (95% CI: 5.8-10.4), and 139 95% by 11.2 days (95% CI: 7.6-18.0) (Figure 2A) . 140
141
We estimate the mean time to viral clearance, defined as having no detectable virus in the 142 blood, to be 9.9 days (95% CI: 6.9-21.4). We estimate that 5% of cases will have no detectable virus by 143 2.4 days after infection (95% CI: 0.09-5.9), 25% by 5.8 days (95% CI: 1.4, 9. 2), 75% by 12.7 days (95% CI: 144 9.2-25.9), and 95% by 18.9 days (95% CI: 13.6-79.4) ( Figure 2B) . 145
146
We estimate the mean time to seroconversion is 9.1 days (95% CI: 7.0-11.6). ). We estimate that 147 5% of cases will have detectable antibodies by 4.4 days after infection (95% CI: 1.3-7.0), 25% by 7.1 days 148 (95% CI: 4.0, 9.2), 75% by 10.1 days (95% CI: 8.7-14.6), and 95% by 13.7 days (95% CI: 10.6-21.7) 149 ( Figure 2C) . 150 
Implications for Surveillance and Blood Supply Safety 157
The mean time to viral clearance from the blood is 9.9 days, hence, in settings with ongoing 158 transmission, if no screening of any type were performed, there would be a 9.9 per 100,000 donors 159 increase (95% CI: 6.9-21.4) in the risk of a blood donation being infected with Zika for every 1 in 100,000 160 increase in daily Zika incidence. Preventing those with recent symptoms of possible Zika infection from 161 donating would only decrease this risk by 7% (RR 0.93, 95% CI 0.89-0.99), as 80% of individuals with Zika 162 infection are asymptomatic, and even those who do develop symptoms will be infectious but 163 asymptomatic for an average of six days (assuming blood donations can transmit Zika virus from the 164 moment of infection). Serological screening is more effective, reducing the risk by 29% (RR 0.71, 95% CI: 165 0.28-0.88), but still only marginally improves blood supply safety. 166
167
Since it may not be practical to stop blood donations until the Zika epidemic has passed, 168 countries may consider virologic (i.e., nucleic acid) testing of particular lots of donated blood for 169 targeted use in pregnant women. Still, even nucleic acid testing is imperfect; we did find a single case of 170 a negative virologic blood test followed by a positive one, though this was in the context of a perinatal 171 transmission and not part of our main analysis. 38 172 173 In settings where the risk is solely from imported Zika cases, ensuring blood supply safety is far 174 easier. By 23.4 (95% CI, 14.3-154.3) days after infection, 99% of infections are expected to no longer 175 have detectable virus in their blood. While this number cannot be estimated with confidence given the 176 low number of observations it is based upon, it can serve as the basis for a risk averse donation rule (e.g. 177 no donation for 300 days after travel to a Zika endemic regions, over twice the upper limit of the 178 confidence interval for this estimate). 179
180
It is important to note that here we assume that not having detectable virus in blood implies 181 safe blood donation; however, risk to the blood supply when virus is present in other fluids cannot be 182 ruled out. We found four cases in which virus was no longer detectable in blood but a saliva, nasal, or 183 urine sample tested positive (Table 1 ). While we have inadequate data to estimate the time to viral 184 clearance in these fluids, we estimate the latest of these positive tests was 12.0 days after infection 185 (95% CI: 10.1-18.2) for the individuals in our dataset. Duration of viremia in other fluids may be relevant 186 to other public health recommendations (e.g., how long to abstain from sex with a potentially pregnant 187 partner). 188
189

DISCUSSION 190
As of time of writing, the WHO reports the incubation period of Zika virus as unclear, but likely 191 "a few days." 39 Likewise, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) states that the 192 incubation period of Zika is unknown but probably "a few days to a week," 40 This analysis is based on published data that was collected for reasons other than estimation of 205 these key distributions; as such we were required to make several assumptions. We assumed that the 206 virologic testing of blood or sera is 100% sensitive for detecting Zika virus; however there is evidence 207 that viral shedding can continue far longer in urine and other bodily fluids, raising concerns that virus 208 may exist in the blood below the limit of detection. We assumed that the distribution of time to 209 seropositivity is independent of previous infection with other flaviviruses (those with prior flavivirus 210 infections will likely seroconvert more quickly). Since the majority of the cases included in our analysis 211 were travelers returning to countries with little endemic flavivirus circulation, it is likely our estimates of 212 time to seroconversion are conservative (i.e., long). Further, the majority of our data comes from 213 presumed mosquito infections, and these distributions may differ for other routes of infection (e.g., 214 perinatal, sexual). Likewise, all of the cases we report were symptomatic, and the distribution of time to 215 seroconversion and viral clearance may differ in asymptomatic individuals. However, the biggest 216 limitation of our analysis is the small number of cases, which both increases uncertainty and the 217 potential for bias. 218
219
Despite the limitations of this analysis, our estimates are the most detailed, quantitative 220 estimates to date for the natural history of Zika virus. These estimates can be used to target 221 surveillance in both endemic settings and for returning travelers as well as guide empirical efforts to 222 study basic features of this pathogen. 223 224 225
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